产品质量保证保险改善产品质量的机制和条件——基于信息不对称条件下产品质量博弈的分析  

Conditions of Product Quality Bonds:Analysis Based on the Product Quality Game Under Conditions of Asymmetric Information

作　　者：何绍慰[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南大学经济研究所,河南开封475004

出　　处：《河南大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第1期28-33,共6页Journal of Henan University(Social Sciences）

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"产品质量保证保险机制在我国产品质量安全管理中的应用研究"(09CJY090)阶段性成果;河南省高校青年骨干教师支持计划"产品质量安全视角下我国产品质量保证保险的机制设计与创新路径研究"(2012GGJS-038)阶段性成果;河南省高校科技创新人才支持计划阶段性成果

摘　　要：交易双方在信息不对称条件下的非合作博弈是导致我国产品质量整体水平低下的一个重要根源。产品质量保证保险机制有助于修正交易中的信息不对称状态,改善博弈均衡,并促成市场上优胜劣汰机制的生成,进而全面改善产品质量水平。充分实现这种机制,需要保险人切实完善业务管理机制以确保有效把握投保企业的产品质量信息,加强自身信用和偿付能力建设以确保卓越的市场信誉,同时积极推动产品质量保证保险与产品责任保险机制的协同发展以更全面地保护消费者利益。One important cause of poor product quality in China is the noncooperative game playing between producers and consumers under the conditions of asymmetric information.Product quality bonds contributes to the modification of asymmetrical state in the market,and then improve the behaviors of game between producers and consumers,thus facilitating the mechanism of the ＂survival of the fittest＂,and finally improving the product quality.For the Mechanism to be fully realized,insurers should perfect business managements to ensure that they can hold the insurance applicants＇ product quality information effectively,strengthen their credit and solvency so as to keep their outstanding market prestige,and promote the cooperative development between product quality bonds and product liability insurance in order to protect the consumers＇ rights and interests comprehensively.

关 键 词：产品质量保证保险 信息不对称 产品质量博弈 

分 类 号：F840[经济管理—保险]