防范发电市场中双重规制合谋的机制设计  

Prevention mechanism design against double regulation collusion behaviors in power generation markets

作　　者：任玉珑[1] 杨菲菲[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2012年第6期751-758,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(90510016)

摘　　要：发电市场中投资回报率规制会带来规制合谋问题,它在经济性规制与社会性规制并存的规制格局下表现为双重规制合谋.应用组织合谋理论的委托代理分析框架,对两种不同规制次序的双重规制模式分别进行防舍谋机制的设计,并讨论了政府在两种规制模式之间的选择.研究表明:发电企业在发电技术水平和治污积极性方面合谋空间的相对大小会影响政府对双重规制模式的选择,而在政府的既定选择下,通过改变对规制者的收入配置以及对企业的出力分配可以有效防范规制合谋.Rate of return regulation in power markets brings about regulation collusion, which is a double regulation collusion when economic regulation and social regulation coexist. Based on the principal-agent framework of the organizational collusion theory, the paper designs the best collusion-proof mechanisms under two kinds of double regulation modes with different regulation orders. It also discusses the government＇s choices between the two regulation modes. It is shown that the government＇s choice between the two regulation modes depends on the relative size of the colluding space in the power technology and the handling-pollution enthusiasm of the power enterprises. Once the government＇s choice is determined, improving the income- distribution of the regulators and capacity-distribution of the power enterprises can effectively prevent the regulation collusion.

关 键 词：发电市场 双重规制合谋 机制设计 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济]