国有垄断行业改革中的利益集团——20世纪80年代以来盐业管制的演进  

Interest Groups in the Reform of the SOE-monopolized Industry ——The Evolution of Salt Regulation from 1980s

作　　者：严雷[1,2] 刘晴[3] 

机构地区：[1]安徽大学经济学院,安徽合肥230039 [2]江苏科技大学公共管理学院,江苏镇江212003 [3]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2013年第1期75-83,共9页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目(07AJL011);安徽省社科规划项目(AHSK11-12D242)

摘　　要：盐业管制的演进是具有组织优势的利益集团在变动环境中施加影响的结果,案例提供了利益集团推动或阻碍政策从垄断走向竞争的证据,并验证了经典文献的观点。20世纪80年代"盐荒"时盐碱双方的政策竞争就已存在,20世纪90年代在消除碘缺乏症的机遇下盐业部门促成了食盐专营,但纯碱和氯碱行业对工业盐维持计划管理的激烈反对导致市场部分放开;此后专营弊端不断暴露促使决策者试图改革盐业体制,但缺乏强大且有强烈激励的竞争性集团参与,盐业集团对改革的阻碍屡获成功。It resulted in the evolution of salt market regulation that interest groups with more organizational advantages influ enced policy-making in dynamic circumstances.When the salt shortage suddenly arose in 1980s,chlor-alkali and soda in dustries competed for favorable polices with the salt industry.In 1990s,the opportunity that China government decided to eliminate iodine deficiency was seized by the salt industry for keeping wholesale monopoly of common salt,but chlor-alkali and soda industries drastically fought against the planned economy of industry-used salt so that salt used by these industries was deregulated.Exposition of disadvantages of common salt monopoly caused policymaker to try to reform salt regulation,but because of absence of strong interest groups which oppose the wholesale monopoly,the interest group in the salt industry al ways success in holding back the reform.

关 键 词：盐业 管制 利益集团 国有企业 垄断 

分 类 号：F262[经济管理—国民经济]