区域合作中不完全府际契约有效执行的策略——基于声誉机制的视角  

A Discussion on the Effective Implementation Strategies of the Incomplete Intergovernmental Agreement in Regional Cooperation——From the Perspective of Reputation Mechanism

作　　者：胡炜光[1] 杨爱平[2] 

机构地区：[1]广州大学松田学院,广东广州511370 [2]华南师范大学公共管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《汕头大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2012年第6期79-84,93,共6页Journal of Shantou University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目"区域契约行政的激励与约束机制研究"(10BZZ026);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"区域一体化中的政府间合作机制创新研究--以珠三角区域一体化为例"(09YJC810013)

摘　　要：区域合作过程中,地方官员之间的博弈是有限次数的博弈、缔约各方之间的信息不对称、地方官员追求短期政绩、缺乏对违约行为的惩罚机制等,造成基于声誉的自我执行机制难以凑效,从而影响了府际契约的执行效力。基于此提出的建议是:需要树立"重复博弈"的思想、建立区域合作的信息交互机制、建立科学的政绩考核体系、建立违约的责任追究制度。From the perspective of the reputation mechanism of incomplete contract, this article analyses the causes of the low efficiency of intergovernmental agreement in regional cooperation, and proposes solutions accordingly. In regional cooperation, because of such factors as the limited number of the game between local officials, information asymmetry between contracting parties, local officials ’ pursuit of short -term performance, and the lack of punishment mechanism for breaches of contract, etc. the reputation -based self enforcing mechanism scarcely functions, which even affects the executory effect of intergovernmental agreements. Accordingly this article suggests fostering a 'repeated game' mentality, establishing the information exchange mechanism of regional cooperation, creating a scientific performance evaluation system, and building an accountability system for breaches of contract.

关 键 词：区域合作 不完全府际契约 有效执行 声誉机制 

分 类 号：D67[政治法律—政治学]