金融脆弱性中的政策陷阱  

Pitfalls Due to Financial Fragility

作　　者：海曼.明斯基 赵准[2] 

机构地区：[1]美国华盛顿大学路易斯分校 [2]清华大学社会科学学院经济学研究所

出　　处：《政治经济学评论》2013年第1期210-221,共12页China Review of Political Economy

摘　　要：第二次世界大战后的美国大政府政策通过日益增大的政府支出和财政赤字,在私人投资下降的情况下保持了工商业利润,在长达35年的时间里防止了深度衰退和经济危机的发生;但不成熟的最后贷款人政策鼓励了银行和企业不负责任的债务实验,造就出日益脆弱的金融系统,带来了20世纪60年代以来越来越频繁的信贷危机和70年代以来深刻、持久的通货膨胀。为了实现稳定价格下的充分就业,有必要提高小企业、小银行的比重,进行更激进的金融和产业重组。In the thirty-five years after World War Ⅱ, me US big government policy successfullysustained the business profits by the rising governmentspending and fiscal deficits when private investment fell, and avoided deep economic depressions and crises. However, the premature lender-of-last-resort policy encouraged irresponsibieliability experimentation by bankers and businessmen, bringing about more and more fragilefinancial system. This led to more frequent credit crunches since 1960s, and more and more seriousand persistentinflation since 1970s. In order to realize full employment at stable prices, it is necessary to increase the weight of the smaller banks and firms in the economy, and to take a quite radical restructuring of financeand industry.

关 键 词：政策陷阱 金融脆弱 最后贷款人 

分 类 号：F831[经济管理—金融学]