责任保险人参与赔偿模式的路径选择  

Path Choice of the Liability Insurer's Mode of Indemnity Participation

作　　者：董惠江[1] 徐广海[2] 

机构地区：[1]黑龙江大学民商法学研究中心,哈尔滨150080 [2]黑龙江大学法学院,哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《学术交流》2013年第1期88-92,共5页Academic Exchange

摘　　要：抗辩与和解控制模式,虽可以控制被保险人的道德风险,保障保险人利益,却不免"异化"为保险人通过保险合同不当干预被保险人的手段,严重损害被保险人乃至第三人利益。而抗辩与和解义务模式,在美国保险公司具备了较为完善的法律服务团队、法官衡平裁判的环境下尚有困境,面对制度移植中的立法成本及"同质性"规则下保费的提高,对我国责任保险制度而言显然并不适合;台湾地区"保险人参与权"模式既避免了被保险人因"被代理"抗辩与和解而产生的利益冲突,开通了保险人"参与"之路径,消除"遥控"的弊端,又明确了保险人滥用参与权之后果,完全可以借鉴,并进一步做体系化的设计,形成我国责任保险人参与模式的路径。Defense and reconciliation mode cannot avoid the alienation that insurer improperly interferes insurant by insurance contract and even damage the rights of the insurant and the benefit of third party, although it could control moral risks of the insured and secure their interests. However, defense and reconciliation mode is hard to gear into our liability insurance system, due to the lawmaking cost of system transplant and the increased premium under ＂similarity＂ rule. Even for the U.S. insurance companies who had relatively - comprehensive service teams, and the fair justice from judges, the mode faces dilemma. In Taiwan, ＂insurer participation rights＂ mode solves the interests conflict of reconciliation incurred by ＂negative agency＂ defense of the insured, pioneering a way for insurer＇ s ＂participation＂. It eliminates the weakness from the ＂remote control＂, and clarifies the result from insurer＇ s abuse of participation rights. Therefore, we can draw reference from Taiwan mode and optimize it to form our own path for liabiIity insurer＇s participation.

关 键 词：抗辩与和解控制 抗辩与和解义务 保险人参与权 

分 类 号：D922.55[政治法律—民商法学]