公开增发新股与定向增发新股中盈余管理的比较研究  

A Comparative Study of Earnings Management between Seasoned Public Offering and Directional Seasoned Offering

作　　者：章卫东[1] 刘珍秀[2] 孙一帆[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计发展研究中心/会计学院,江西南昌330013 [2]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《当代财经》2013年第1期118-128,F0003,共12页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"地方国有上市公司定向增发资产注入动机及经济后果研究"(71262004);江西省社科规划重点课题"上市公司资产注入与公司绩效关系研究"(10YJ04)

摘　　要：文章采用大股东与小股东代理理论对我国上市公司公开增发新股与定向增发新股中的盈余管理问题进行了研究。研究发现,由于大股东在股权再融资中存在获取私人利益的动机,上市公司在公开增发新股和定向增发新股前都存在盈余管理现象,但公开增发新股前进行的是正的盈余管理,而定向增发新股前进行盈余管理的方式与定向增发新股的类型有关。By employing the agency theory of major shareholders and minority shareholders, this paper conducts a study of the earnings management problem of China＇s listed companies concerning the seasoned public offering and directional seasoned offering. The results indicate that because the major shareholders have the motives of obtaining their private interests in the equity refinancing, there exists the phenomenon of earnings management in the listed companies before their seasoned public offering and directional seasoned offering. However, before the seasoned public offering the earnings management is positive, while before the directional seasoned offering the method of earnings manage- ment is related to the types of the directional seasoned offering.

关 键 词：上市公司 控股股东 代理成本 增发新股 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F234.3[经济管理—会计学]