新经济地理学视域下区际污染、生态治理及补偿  

An Analysis of the Regional Pollution Externality,Ecological Compensation and Its Leader:Based on the New Economic Geography

作　　者：安虎森[1] 周亚雄[2] 颜银根[3] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济研究所 [2]南开大学经济学院 [3]河南大学黄河文明与可持续发展研究中心

出　　处：《南京社会科学》2013年第1期15-23,共9页Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目"十二五时期调整城乡结构和推进城镇化研究"(10AZD004);教育部人文社科规划基金项目"转移支付和区域协调发展研究"(10YJA790001)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文利用经济要素空间作用力的均衡机制,探讨了污染外部性条件下的市场失灵、区际生态环境保护与补偿政策。研究表明,当污染与交易成本都很低时,在很低的概率下市场机制是有效的;当污染很小且交易成本很大时,政府陷入干预的盲区;在更普遍情形下污染外部性会导致市场失灵。因为政府治理市场失灵会引起区域间利益重置,所以需要通过区际生态补偿来保证生态环境保护政策的实施;地方政府的利益博弈往往会导致政府失灵;中央政府在治理污染、区际生态环境保护与要素最优配置目标上具有同一性,从而只要能够突破财政约束,中央政府就会不遗余力地推进区际生态补偿政策。Based on the new economic geography theory and applied the spatial force balancing mechanism of economic factor, we discussed the market failure rised from pollution externality, re- gional ecological protection and compensation policy, and the policy leader. The research shows that when pollution and transaction cost is very low, the market mechanism is effective in a small proba- bility ; when the pollution is very small and the transaction cost is large, the government will fall into the blind spot; more often the pollution externality leads to market failure. Because managing market failure by government will cause the regional interest reset, the inter-regional ecological compensa- tion policy is needed to be applied; The interest game leading by local government often leads to the government failure, while the central government has the same goal on pollution control, regional ecological environmental protection and the factor optimal allocation, then as long as it is able to break the fiscal constraint, the central government will do its best to promote the inter-regional ecological compensation policy.

关 键 词：污染外部性 市场失灵 生态环境保护 区际生态补偿的主体 

分 类 号：F139.9[经济管理—世界经济]