不完全契约、专用性投资与纵向一体化  

Incomplete Contract,Specific Investment and Vertical Integration

作　　者：徐斌[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学工商管理学院,江西南昌330013 [2]江西财经大学产业经济研究院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《经济经纬》2013年第1期67-71,共5页Economic Survey

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC790306)

摘　　要：笔者探讨了不完全契约情形下市场交易、长期契约和纵向一体化的专用性投资水平。基于博弈结构,我们将市场交易和长期契约分别视为鲁宾斯坦和纳什谈判方式。结论表明,纵向一体化能达到最优的专用性投资水平,并且,在长期契约中下游企业的专用性投资水平要高于市场交易。进一步表明,为了消除市场交易情况下专用性投资的不足,可取的办法不仅仅是纵向一体化,长期契约也是可行的办法,但它的投资激励不如一体化。This paper discusses specific investment level of market trade, long-term contract and vertical integration under the condition of incomplete contract. It is found that vertical integration can attain optimal specific investment level, and specific investment level of downstream firm under long-term contract is higher than under market trade. In order to make up shortage of specific investment under market trade, an advisable way not only is vertical integration, but also long-term contract under special case, but its investment incen- tive is lower than under vertical integration.

关 键 词：专用性投资 不完全契约 鲁宾斯坦谈判 纳什谈判 纵向一体化 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]