“农超对接”供应链的治理模式和专用性投资激励研究  

Research on the Governance Model of Farmer-Supermarket Direct-Purchase Supply Chain & the Incentive for Specific Investment

作　　者：浦徐进[1,2] 朱秋鹰 曹文彬 

机构地区：[1]江南大学商学院,214122 [2]江南大学江苏食品安全研究基地,江苏无锡214122

出　　处：《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第1期85-92,共8页Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才计划(NCET-10-0458);国家自然科学基金项目(70901034)

摘　　要：针对目前我国农户加入"农超对接"供应链意愿不足这一现实问题,首先,分析"农超对接"供应链的不完全契约特征;其次,构建了三种不同治理模式的数学模型,对比农户最优专用性投资水平的差异;最后,建立事后再协商的讨价还价动态博弈模型,研究影响农户专业性投资水平的因素。研究表明:以激励农户提高专用性投资水平作为标准,事后再协商模式将比事后不协商模式更具优势;如果农户预期到自己在事后再协商中会面临被"敲竹杠"的风险,将会降低事前的专用性投资水平;可以从改造农超双方不平衡的上下层结构关系入手,来激励农户提高专用性投资水平。Based on the problem that farmers are reluctant to join in the farmer-supermarket direct-pur- chase supply chain. Firstly, we depict the incomplete contract characteristics of the supply chain. Secondly, we construct three different governance models and compare the differences of farmers＇ optimal level of specific investment. Finally; we establish the bargaining dynamic game model to analyze factors affecting farmers＇ specific investment. The analysis shows that, after the re-negotiation mode has advan- tages over by motivating farmers to improve the specific investment levels as a standard. If the farmers expect to face the risk of the hold-up problem afterwards, they will reduce the advance level of specific investments. The farmers＇ specific investment can be improved through the transformation of the imbalance relationship between upper and lower sides.

关 键 词：农超对接 不完全契约 治理模式 专用性投资激励 

分 类 号：F304.3[经济管理—产业经济]