“农超对接”中的委托代理问题研究——以农产品质量安全为例  

Research on Principal-Agent Problem in the Alliance of Agriculture and Supermarkets:——Taking the Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products as an Example

作　　者：费威[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理科学与工程博士后流动站,辽宁大连116024 [2]东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第1期93-99,共7页Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(12JZD025);国家自然科学基金项目(70902062;70901016;71271045);辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L11DJY046);辽宁省教育科学"十二五"规划项目(JG12DB079;JG12DB086);大连市社科院课题(2012dlskyb106)

摘　　要：基于委托代理理论,针对"农超对接"中超市为确保农户提供高质量安全农产品,对农户实施参与和激励约束的问题,建立模型并利用库恩—塔克条件进行分析。结果表明:以超市为主导的"农超对接"模式中,若要满足农户参与和激励约束,则超市收购高质量安全农产品与其他采购商收购低质量非安全农产品的价格差额,加之超市对农户种植农产品的单位投资补贴之和,应该等于农户种植高低质量两类农产品的单位成本差额;同时若农产品质量检测不合格对农户施加的边际惩罚额应等于超市进行质量安全检测的边际成本。并据此提出建议,为保障我国农产品质量安全,进一步推广和实施"农超对接"提供参考依据。Based the principal-agent theory, the supermarket makes the participation constraint and the incentive compatible constraint for the farmers to ensure the supply of the agricultural products of high quality and safety, this paper builds the model and solves the model by the Kuhn-Tucker condition. The results show that if the participation constraint and the incentive compatible constraint of the farmers are satisfied in the alliance of agriculture and supermarkets with the supermarket as the dominant factor, and then the sum of the difference between the price paid by the supermarket, the price paid by the other purchasers, and the investment subsidy, should be equal to the plant cost difference, and while the mar- ginal fine for the farmers who supply the inferior quality agricultural products should be equal to the marginal cost for the quality testing. Finally, some advices are put forward for the agricultural products quality and safety, and the development of the alliance of agriculture and supermarkets in China.

关 键 词：农超对接 委托代理问题 超市 库恩-塔克条件 农产品质量安全 

分 类 号：F304.3[经济管理—产业经济]