显性与隐性激励下的电信业务创新的共赢合同设计  

A Win-Win Contract on the Combination of Explicit and Implicit Incentives in Telecom Business Innovation

作　　者：沈焱[1] 王晓明[1] 李仕明[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《预测》2013年第1期67-71,共5页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71202074);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(ZYGX2010J130)

摘　　要：本文基于经典的委托代理框架,用体现共赢的价值偏好参数(描述委托人关心自己与他人的程度)修改了委托人(运营商)的目标函数,并在代理人(服务提供商)的效用函数中引入隐性激励要素,集中考察了运营商与服务提供商之间显性与隐性激励相结合的业务创新合同设计问题,进而分析了价值偏好参数、隐性激励的边际产出系数以及创新投入的外部性产出系数对合同参数、业绩以及代理成本的影响。结果表明:价值偏好参数可以协调各利益主体间的价值关系并有效控制代理成本,而隐性激励的边际产出系数以及创新投入的外部性产出系数则对显性激励结构具有重要影响。Based on the classical principal-agent framework, this paper improves the principle＇ s objective function, and puts the implicit incentive element into the agent＇ s utility function. Then, in combination of traits of the telecom indus- try, it investigates intensively the combinative incentive and win-win contract design between a telecom operator and a service provider, and it further explores the influences of value preference, implicit incentive coefficient, and external output coefficient of innovation input on contract parameters, performances and agency cost. Results show that the value preference parameter can coordinate the benefits between cooperators and control agency costs effectively, both implicit incentive coefficient and external output coefficient of innovation input have an important influence on explicit incentive structure.

关 键 词：电信业务创新 显性激励 隐性激励 共赢合同 

分 类 号：F626.11[经济管理—产业经济]