新中国农地制度变迁博弈机制探析  

On Evolution of Agricultural Land System in PRC Based on Game Mechanism in China

作　　者：王浩[1] 刘荣利[2] 白晓玉[3] 

机构地区：[1]洛阳理工学院工程管理系,河南洛阳471023 [2]中共洛阳市委党校管理教研部,河南洛阳471003 [3]贺州学院人文与管理系,广西贺州542800

出　　处：《鸡西大学学报（综合版）》2013年第1期56-57,67,共3页JOurnal of Jixi University:comprehensive Edition

基　　金：河南省哲学社科规划项目"粮食核心区农地产权制度创新研究";编号:2010CJJ024;河南省软科学项目"粮食核心区粮农增收与经济增长协动机理与政策创新研究";编号:112400420032;河南省政府决策研究招标项目"河南省实施重大民生工程的绩效与机制创新研究";编号:2012B466

摘　　要：农村土地制度涉及中央政府、地方政府、农民等多元化的利益群体和组织,这决定了农地制度变迁是一个不同利益群体之间互相博弈的过程。制度变迁的路径和模式,取决于各利益群体之间博弈均衡的结果,并且大都存在着能够发挥决定性影响的主导群体和组织。新老解放区的土改运动、社会主义过渡时期的合作化运动以及计划经济体制下的人民公社制度,都是在中央政府的主导下推行的强制性农地制度变迁,取得了显著不同的制度绩效。改革开放以来的农地制度创新模式,多由农民和农村基层组织所首创,并在地方政府的推动下最终得以完成制度变迁过程。The paper argues that the evolution of rural land system is seen as a game process on the basis of different inter- est groups. The paths and patterns of institutional changes rested on the game results among different interest groups during which there were some dominant interests groups which played a decisive role. Since 1978, most of changes of the agricultural land system were firstly created by farmers and rural grassroots organizations and then promoted by local government which is not the same as that of changes promoted compulsorily by the central government.

关 键 词：制度变迁 土地制度 农地产权 博弈论 

分 类 号：F321.1[经济管理—产业经济]