逆向供应链群体演化的Stackelberg博弈分析  

Stakelberg game analysis of reverse supply chain with group evolutionary characteristic

作　　者：易俊[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学财务与国有资产管理处,广州510632

出　　处：《深圳大学学报（理工版）》2013年第1期103-108,共6页Journal of Shenzhen University(Science and Engineering)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872039)~~

摘　　要：建立具有群体演化特征的逆向供应链斯塔克伯格(Stakelberg)博弈模型,分析逆向供应链上游制造商或回收厂的机会主义行为,指出"幼稚"的下游个体商贩群体面临分拣、未加处理和掺杂3种回收策略,并与"老练"的上游制造商进行价格竞争.仿真分析表明,若制造商或回收厂遵守按质论价的口头协议,则双方演化稳定均衡为帕累托最优;若制造商或回收厂为"机会主义"行为类型,则演化稳定均衡结果取决于个体商贩中采取分拣策略所占比例大小.The itinerant traders and their family workshops become the mainly supply chain. The Stackelberg game model of reverse supply chain is built recycle models of Chinese reverse considering the group evolutionary characteristic. The itinerant traders are the puerile group facing three strategies, i. e. , the sorting, the untreated and the adulteration, and the manufacture/recovery plant is the experienced individual player taken the second action. Both groups make the price competition. The results show that the evolutionary equilibrium result of re-verse supply chain is the sorting and the higher recycling price, if the manufacture/recovery plant obeys the oral contract of pricing by quality. However, if the manufacture/recovery plant takes the opportunism behavior, the evolutionary equilibrium result depends on the itinerant traders sharing the proportion size of the sorting strategy.

关 键 词：供应链 博弈论 逆向物流 演化算法 演化博弈 斯塔克伯格博弈 废品回收 个体商贩群 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]