真之同一论与单称命题  

The Identity Theory of Truth and Singular Proposition

作　　者：刘满新[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学逻辑与认知研究所

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2012年第4期77-87,共11页Studies in Logic

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目(批准号11CZX044);中央高校基本科研业务费中山大学青年教师培育项目(批准号13WKPY32)

摘　　要：麦道的哲学试图抹去心灵与世界之间的本体论间隙。为了实现这一哲学计划,麦道需要接受某种真之同一论。本文认为,麦道所需要的是真之坚实同一论,并且承诺关于罗素式单称命题。本文首先论证真之同一论论题,然后更进一步,在麦道的哲学计划下辩护真之坚实同一论,认为真命题与世界中的事实同一。本文并非要给出一个对同一论或坚实同一论的完整理论,而是试图在麦道的哲学计划下给出一个对坚实同一论的辩护,认为坚实同一论是可行的。One of John McDowell＇s philosophical projects is to eliminate the ontological gap between mind and world. To accomplish this project, McDowell needs endorse some form of identity theory of truth. In the paper, I will argue that what McDowell needs is the robust identity theory of truth. Moreover, for this purpose, McDowell should also endorse a Russellian account for singular proposition. To show this, I will first articulate and argue for the claim of the identity theory of truth in general. Furthermore, I will pro- vide a defense, within McDowell＇s philosophical project, for the robust identity theory, arguing that truth propositions are identical to facts in the world. It is not the primary aim of this paper to put forward a complete account for the identity theory of truth, or the robust identity theory. Instead, this paper aims at defending the robust identity theory within a McDowellian framework.

关 键 词：真理论 同一论 单称命题 

分 类 号：B812[哲学宗教—逻辑学]