ONETA： Prior-free and Truthful Auctions with Adaptive Reserve Price for High Revenue in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks  

作　　者：WU Xiaobing CHEN Guihai 

机构地区：[1]State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Department of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China [2]Shanghai Key Laboratory of Scalable Computing and Systems, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200240, China

出　　处：《Chinese Journal of Electronics》2012年第2期355-361,共7页电子学报（英文版）

基　　金：Manuscript Received Sept. 2010; Accepted Aug. 2011. This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China （No.60825205, No.60903179, No.61073152, No.61103224, No.61170236, No.61133006）.

摘　　要：Auction is efficient for spectrum allocation in future dynamic spectrum access networks. Truthful or strategy-proof auction is favorable since every bidder only needs to bid his true valuation and the auctioneer assigns spectra to bidders who value them most. Existing truth- ful spectrum auction schemes however either generate very low revenue for the auctioneer or need extra prior distri- bution information on the true valuation of bidders. Low revenue generation could discourage the auctioneers from leasing their spectra and it is usually hard to get prior in- formation on bidders＇ true evaluations on the spectra. In this paper~ we propose a class of truthful spectrum auc- tion schemes which bring higher revenue for the spectrum owners and do not need any prior information at the same time. We present both theoretical and simulation results of our proposed auction schemes.

关 键 词：Spectrum auction Prior-free Truthful Reserve price Dynamic spectrum access networks. 

分 类 号：TP311.132[自动化与计算机技术—计算机软件与理论] TN915.61[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]