基于博弈模型的“企业研发经费加计扣除”政策分析  

Analysis on Gross-Up and Deduction Policy of Enterprise’s Research and Development Funds Base on Game Model

作　　者：蒋占华[1] 黄阳[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国煤炭科工集团有限公司,北京100013 [2]武汉理工大学管理学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《煤炭经济研究》2013年第1期47-53,共7页Coal Economic Research

基　　金：2012年度国家软科学资助研究项目(2012GXS3B033)

摘　　要：基于"企业研发经费加计扣除"政策,从利益博弈的视角出发,分别构建了地方政府与中央政府以及地方政府与企业之间的混合战略演化博弈模型,剖析了政策执行效率低下的根本原因。进而建立相应的系统动力学仿真模型,借助数据仿真分析不同变量对政策执行情况的动态影响。研究结果表明,奖惩力度、执行成本、优惠力度、申报成本是该项政策失效的关键因素。最后,在政策仿真结论的基础上,为政府部门提出了针对性的政策性建议。Base on the gross-up and deduction policy of the enterprise＇ s research and development funds, from the view of the profit game, a mixed strategy evolutionary game model between the local government and central government as well as the local government and enterprise was individually established. The basic causes of the low policy implemented efficiency were analyzed. Thus a related system dynamic simulation model was established. With the data simulation, an analysis was con- ducted on the dynamic influences of the different variation to the implementing conditions of the policy. The study results showed that the reward and punishment power, implementing cost, preference power and application cost were the key factors of the policy failure. Finally base on the policy simulation conclusion, the pertinence policy proposals were provided to the Government Department.

关 键 词：企业研发经费 加计扣除政策 演化博弈 SD仿真模型 政策性建议 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]