基于声誉模型的武器装备承制商失信行为防范分析  

Prevention Analysis for Dishonest Act of Weapon Equipment Supplier Based on Reputation Model

作　　者：张蓉[1] 陈云翔[1] 

机构地区：[1]空军工程大学装备管理与安全工程学院,陕西西安710038

出　　处：《物流科技》2013年第2期42-44,47,共4页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：国防基金项目;项目编号:51327020104

摘　　要：武器装备承制商的失信行为造成装备采办的"拖进度、降性能、涨费用"现象,严重阻碍我军装备的建设与发展。分析了导致承制商失信行为的原因以及重复博弈形成声誉效应的机理,构建了武器装备承制商声誉模型,结果表明该模型能够激励承制商积极建立好声誉、减少失信行为。通过建立信用评价体制能够确保声誉机制更好地发挥作用,在一定程度上防止承制商发生失信行为。The dishonest act of weapon equipment supplier causes a series of such as ＂dragging progress, reducding performance, rising cost＂, which seriously hinder the development of military equipment. This paper analyzes the reasons leading to the dishon- est act of weapon equipment supplier, as well as the mechanism of the repeated game forming reputation effects. The paper constructed a reputation model of weapon equipment supplier. The results show that the model can inspire supplier to actively establish a good reputation and reduce dishonest act. Through establishing the credit evaluation system, it can ensure the reputation mechanism to better play the role and prevents the dishonest act.

关 键 词：武器装备承制商 重复博弈 声誉机制 信用评价 

分 类 号：E241[军事—军事理论]