农地征收补偿标准的困境解析与机制设计——基于信息不对称下的一个讨价还价框架  

The Dilemma Analysis and Mechanism Design of Land Taking Compensatory with Asymmetric Information

作　　者：熊金武[1] 黄义衡[2] 徐庆[2] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学社会科学学院,北京100084 [2]上海财经大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2013年第1期3-10,共8页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(07cjl020);中国博士后科学基金项目(2012M510391)

摘　　要：土地征收是我国农地城市化的唯一途径,而农地征收补偿标准在大规模土地城市化浪潮中争论尤多。补偿标准核定可以理解为信息不对称下的定价行为,但是在中国,这种信息不对称问题在土地制度和征收制度下陷入困境而不能得到解决。传统农地年产值补偿法和区片综合地价无法满足居民户的激励相容条件和参与性约束条件。孙中山提出的地价核定方式为解决信息不对称问题提供了思路,即实现信息揭示的直接机制。所以,解决中国农地征收补偿问题在技术层面上可以改革补偿方式,设计一种直接显示机制,不过在制度上的根本出路在于改革土地产权制度和征收制度,即明晰土地产权,恢复居民退出权,保证居民出价权,提高居民评价能力,实现土地要素的市场配置。The purpose of this paper is to clarify the dilemma of today＇s rural-land-urbanization.The methods are mechanism design and game theory.This paper found land taking policy is the only way to urbanize the rural land,and there are full of disputes on the criterion of land taking compensatory recently,which is about how to fix the price in asymmetric information.However,because of China＇s land institution,the problem of information asymmetry couldn＇t be avoided,and farmer＇s interest is harmed.The principle solution is to adjust China＇s rural land property rights structure,take a market-oriented reformation in the rural land urbanization;Sun Yat-sen proposed a referential mechanism to fix the land price,which is a direct mechanism.Totally,the results indicate that,we should take a direct mechanism technically,and adjust the land right system and land taking policy.

关 键 词：土地征收 信息不对称 孙中山 机制设计 

分 类 号：F321.1[经济管理—产业经济]