从博弈论角度研究碳关税征收对国家福利的影响  

The Study on the Impact of Carbon Tariff on National Welfare:From A Game Theory Perspective

作　　者：李劼[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学环境科学与工程学院

出　　处：《林业经济》2013年第1期117-122,128,共7页Forestry Economics

摘　　要：首先分析不征收碳关税时,静态纳什均衡下的企业利润和社会福利。然后讨论在征收碳关税时,政府决定税率的影响因素、企业生产、贸易决策的变化,以及动态子博弈完美纳什均衡下的企业利润和社会福利。最后在比较二者的基础上,提出了降低碳关税对企业利润和社会福利的影响的对策。The paper first analyze enterprise profits and social welfare in the Nash equilibrium under the scenario of no carbon tariff. Then discuss the influential factors of government decision making on carbon tariff, the changes of enterprise production and export strategies under the carbon tariff scenario, and enterprise profits and social welfare in the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Further, based on the comparison of.enterprise profits and social welfare with and without carbon tariff, the paper proposed some suggestions to reduce the negative impacts of carbon tariff on enterprise profits and social welfare.

关 键 词：纳什均衡 子博弈完美纳什均衡 碳关税 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F745F205