政府激励下中小企业贷款融资利益协调机制  

Coordinating Mechanism of SMEs’ Loan Financing Interest under Government Incentive

作　　者：刘红生[1,2] 李帮义[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航天航空大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]宁波鄞州农村合作银行,浙江宁波315100

出　　处：《系统工程》2012年第12期45-50,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(10BGL010);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(09YJA630064);教育部高校博士点基金资助项目(20113218110024)

摘　　要：在对中小企业的支持中,政府起着重要的引导作用,研究政府的激励措施对于解决中小企业融资难具有重要意义。本文在政府与银行组成的约束博弈关系中,引进了业务限制(逆向激励)机制,建立了政府激励下银行中小企业贷款融资激励合约三模型,讨论了奖励因子和业务限制因子的协调作用和效果。研究结果表明:在业务限制因子和奖励因子的共同作用下,政府获得期望收益最大的最优选择是奖励、业务限制同步实施的激励合约。银行在此激励合约下,会采取积极的态度,加大中小企业贷款资金投放力度,使政府与银行的利益关系实现整体协调。Government plays a major role in guiding the development of Small and Medium-sized enterprises （SMEs）. The study on government incentive is therefore of great significance to solving the financing difficulties of Small and Medium-sized enterprises. This research introduces the mechanism of Operational constraints （adverse incentive） into the Constraintgame relation between government and bank. By building models of SMEs＇ financing with three government＇s incentive contracts, this paper analyzes the cooperating effects of the Operational constraints factor compounded the incentive factor. The conclusion is drawn from analysis that, under the mutual effect of incentive factor and operational constraints factor, the optimal solution for government to receive the highest expected return is the contract with synchronous implementation of incentive and operational constraints. With this optimal contract, banks would adopt a cooperative attitude, increase the loan funds for small and medium-sized enterprises and therefore realize the overall harmony on the interest relation between government and bank.

关 键 词：政府激励 中小企业 信贷融资 利益协调机制 合作博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]