政府控制、政治关联与企业信息披露——以内部控制鉴证报告披露为例  

Government Control,Political Connections and Corporate Information Disclosure——Case of Disclosing Internal Control Attestation Reports

作　　者：张志平[1,2] 方红星[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [2]山东大学(威海)商学院,山东威海264209

出　　处：《经济管理》2013年第2期105-114,共10页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"公司治理;外部审计与内部控制信息披露"(70872018);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"中国专业中介市场的结构-行为-绩效问题与规制政策研究"(2009JJD790005);霍英东教育基金会高等院校青年教师基金项目"转轨国家会计改革研究"(111087)

摘　　要：政治是影响企业信息披露行为的重要外在宏观因素,本文根据信号传递理论与成本收益权衡理论,利用2007～2010年非金融类上公司为样本,以内部控制鉴证报告自愿披露为例,从政府控制和政治关联两方面研究政治因素对企业信息披露行为的影响。研究发现,政府控制的公司比非政府控制的公司更不愿意披露内部控制鉴证报告;在非政府控制的公司中,政治关联对公司自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告具有积极影响;而在政府控制的公司中,政治关联对公司自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告具有消极影响。本文研究结论显示,政府控制抑制了公司自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告的信息披露行为;并且政治关联加剧了政府控制的抑制作用,这表明,我国证券监管机构要求上市公司尤其是国有主板上市公司强制披露内部控制鉴证报告的必要性。China is in the transition economies, and there is a lot of information asymmetry in the capital mar-kets. The voluntary information disclosure can reduce the information asymmetry between managers and investors and enhance corporate value. The existing literatures mainly study the impact on the corporate information disclo-sure behaviors from the microcosmic view, including firm characteristics and financial characteristics, but lack of the impact of political factors. Under Chinese special institution environment, corporate control rights include gov- ernment-controlled and non-governmental-controlled rights. Due to being in the property rights discrimination sta-tus, non-government-controlled companies have the positive motivation to establish political connections to protect the property rights, Government-controlled companies have natural advantages of the access to government re-sources. Many executives with the government backgrounds are appointed by the government, and political connec-tions are political rather than economic. So the effects of government control and political connections on the compa-nies＇ disclosing information motivation and behaviors are problems to be settled urgently. The voluntary disclosure behaviors can reflect managers＇ self-selection behaviors in the process of information disclosure. The internal control attestation reporting is subject to the voluntary disclosure before 2012, and its dis- closure acts as a signal role. It transfers a signal of the company＇s ＂effective internal control＂ and ensures ＂relia-ble accounting information under monitoring＂. Taking the internal control attestation reports disclosure as an exam- pie, this paper uses signaling theory, principal-agent theory, property right theory and the cost-benefit tradeoff the-ory to study their impacts on firms＇ information disclosing behaviors from two perspectives of government control and political connections. Taking 2007 - 2010 non-financial companies as a sample, this article uses descriptive

关 键 词：政府控制 政治关联 内部控制鉴证报告 企业信息披露 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]