农户征信制度发挥效用的条件  

Conditions for the Rural Household Credit Reference System to Enhance Utility

作　　者：谷慎[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《征信》2013年第1期27-31,共5页Credit Reference

基　　金：国家社科基金资助项目(09BJY098);西安交通大学创新基金项目(2010S117)

摘　　要：利用演化博弈模型对我国现行征信模式下的征信制度效用进行预测,得出:对失信农户过度的市场惩戒是现行农户征信制度绩效低下和农户贷款交易不足的主要原因;对正负信息全面征信为最优农户征信制度安排;在农村信贷市场,法律惩戒较市场惩戒更优。要充分发挥农户征信制度效用,需满足如下条件:继续强化法律惩戒手段,进一步加大诚信激励力度,尽快提高信用信息质量和信息共享的程度与范围。Forecasting is made on utility of credit institution under the present credit reference systems in China by using the evolutionary game, and conclusions are drawn that the main reason for the poor performance of present ru- ral household credit reference system and insufficient rural household loan transactions at present is the excessive market discipline on dishonest rural households; that the overall credit reference system of positive and negative in- formation is the optimal arrangement for rural household markets, legal discipline is better than market discipline. credit reference system; and that in the rural credit loan In order to maximize the utility of rural household credit reference system, the following conditions should be met： continue to strengthen the legal disciplinary measures; further intensify the incentive for the honesty ; improve the quality of credit information and the extent ＆ scope of in- formation sharing as quickly as possible.

关 键 词：农户征信 征信制度安排 征信制度效用 演化博弈分析 

分 类 号：F830.58[经济管理—金融学]