基于动态博弈过程的地方公共品供给分析  

The Analysis of Local Public Goods Supply Based on Dynamic Game Process

作　　者：黄涛[1] 梅林海[1] 范阳东[2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632 [2]广州医学院,广东广州510182

出　　处：《改革与战略》2013年第2期30-36,共7页Reformation & Strategy

基　　金：教育部2009年人文社科青年基金项目:环境政策综合化与企业环境管理自组织机制的培育与发展(项目编号:09YJC790060)

摘　　要：公共品供给和社会选择存在效率难题。Tiebout模型通过在政府行为中引入竞争机制,完善群体偏好的显示性特征,是实现帕累托生产供给的前提条件。文章旨在通过理论模型及Besley动态博弈过程对居民、地方及中央政府的竞争行为进行模拟,分析公共资源达到效率化配置的长期均衡,进一步说明竞争机制能够限制政府行使权力造成的非效率。There is a efficiency puzzle in the supply of public goods and social choice. In Tiebout model, competitive mechanism is brought into government behavior to perfect the revealed characteristics of group preference, which is the premise condition of realizing Pareto production. This paper simulates the model of the competitive behaviors of residents, local and central government by using theoretical model and Besley dynamic game processes, analyzes the long term equilibrium of public resources to reach the efficient configuration, and then further explain that competitive mechanism can control the inefficiency produced by government.

关 键 词：TIEBOUT模型 动态博弈 公共品供给 竞争机制 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]