供应链突发事件非完全信息动态博弈研究  

Dynamic Game Model of Supply Chain with Incomplete Information under Disruption Situation

作　　者：刘家国[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2012年第6期105-111,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部高等学校博士点专项基金(200802171023);教育部人文社会科学一般研究项目(11YJC630131);黑龙江省自然科学基金(QC2009C26)

摘　　要：以非完全信息动态博弈为例,研究突发事件情形下的供应链节点企业的决策行为。首先依据供应链结构和突发事件类型划分了四种供应链突发事件博弈类型,然后针对具有核心企业供应链在发生内部突发事件的情形下构建了相应的非完全信息动态博弈模型,并对均衡解求解和分析;最后以RSZG造船供应链为例进行了实证分析。研究发现在所构造的非完全信息动态博弈模型中,博弈的结果取决于供应链突发事件发生概率,且无论何种情况核心企业的收益都随着突发事件概率的增加而增加,但当突发事件发生概率增大到一定程度时,核心企业在博弈中的有利地位也渐渐减弱,其收益的增长速度又逐渐减小,非核心企业的情况则相反。This paper proposes a research on supply chain disruption game within incomplete information. Firstly, four kinds of game type of supply chain disruption are given based on the supply chain structure and disruption type. Then, it constructs a dynamic game model with incomplete information for core-company type supply chain meeting internal disruption, and the Nash equilibrium is found and analyzed. At last, an example based on RSZG shipbuilding supply chain is usedi to illustrate how to use the model. It finds that the Nash equilibrium of the constructed model depends on the probability of the supply chain disruption. And the profit of core-company in the supply chain still increases to an extent, and then deceases. The opposite to the core-compang is true for suppliers.

关 键 词：供应链管理 供应链决策 博弈论 突发事件 供应链结构 

分 类 号：F224.9[经济管理—国民经济]