基于EPR的政府与生产企业博弈及制度设计  

Government and Producer 's Game Analysis and Systems Based on EPR

作　　者：郑云虹[1] 田海峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110004

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2012年第6期217-224,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71103030;71173034);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJC790222);教育部博士学科点专项科研基金(20090042110032)

摘　　要：《循环经济促进法》框架下的中国EPR制度存在着制度安排缺失的问题。本文采用博弈分析方法探讨了EPR制度下政府与生产企业之间的关系,揭示了生产企业在政府不同EPR制度设计下的行为反应。研究发现:回收市场没有利益刺激时,如果政府不实施激励,生产企业不会主动承担EOL产品的回收处置责任;政府的激励强度影响企业EOL产品的回收再利用程度;激励强度需要一系列EPR配套制度作为保障。以此为基础,提出了具有激励性的EPR制度体系应包括激励性制度和约束性制度两方面内容的观点,同时做出了相应的制度设计。EPR system under the framework of the ＂Circular Economy Promotion Law＂ has the problem of the lack of system arrangements in China. By the game for the government and the producers, the paper reveals the producer＇ s reaction under the different EPR system designs, pointes out when there isn＇t profit stimulation on the recycling market, if the government chooses no incentive, the producer will not take recycle responsibility in- itiatively. The incentive intensity from the government affects the recycling level of EOL products. The incentive intensity needs a package of systems as a guarantee. Then, to use for reference the practical experience of devel- oped countries, it suggests that the stimulating EPR systems should include the incentive systems and the binding systems, and gives series of inspirational systems for EPR.

关 键 词：管理学 延伸生产者责任制度 博弈分析 末端产品(EOL) 

分 类 号：F062.1[经济管理—政治经济学] C939[经济管理—管理学]