多席位独立董事损害股东价值了吗  

Do Multiple Directorships Harm Shareholder Value

作　　者：陆贤伟[1] 王建琼[1] 董大勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《金融评论》2012年第5期34-44,123,共11页Chinese Review of Financial Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"有限理性下的自媒体证券信息传播:资源价值与负面效应(项目编号:71271174)"

摘　　要：本文利用我国上市公司独立董事提名公告数据,实证检验独立董事的多席位特征对股东财富的影响。研究结果表明,当被提名的独立董事存在多席位时,声明方和被声明方公司的股价均受到负向冲击,且受"牵连"的被声明方股价受到的冲击更强烈;但如果多席位独立董事提名公告源于陷入财务困境的公司,声明方和被声明方的股价则产生正向累积超额收益。此外,在不同代理成本和不同独立董事繁忙程度下,多席位独立董事提名对股价的冲击存在一定差异。总体上来看,本文的研究支持繁忙假说,忙碌的独立董事会损害股东价值;但对于陷入财务困境的公司而言,多席位独立董事的引入更有利于发挥其声誉机制从而增加股东价值。This article empirically analyzes the relationship between multiple-directorships of independent directors and shareholder value.We find that the announcement of multiple-directorships independent directors have significant negative impact on stock return of both the announcer firm and the sender firm and the impact on the sender is greater.And the more costly to hold the position and the busier the announced director is,the greater the impact is.But if the announcement of multiple-directorships independent directors is from a ST company,the announcement return is positive for both the announcer firm and the sender.Our results show that although generally busy multiple directorships harm shareholder value,but for the companies with financial problem the introduction of multiple-directorships can increase firm value due to reputation effect.

关 键 词：繁忙假说 股东财富 独立董事 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F276.6F224