对2个基于身份签名方案的伪造攻击  

Forgery attacks on two identity based signature schemes

作　　者：陈亮[1,2] 崔永泉[1] 田苗苗[3] 付小青[1] 徐鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学计算机科学技术学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]中国科学技术大学计算机科学技术学院,安徽合肥230026 [3]河南科技学院数学系,河南新乡453003

出　　处：《通信学报》2013年第2期123-127,共5页Journal on Communications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61100222;61100221);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金资助项目(2011QN044);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20100480900)~~

摘　　要：对李—姜(2009)和谷—贾—姜(2011)依据Paterson方案(2006)分别提出的标准模型下基于身份的签名方案构造了3个有效的伪造攻击算法:攻击者在不得到任何签名用户私钥的情况下,仅通过选取随机参数以及多项式时间内的计算,便能够以显著的概率成功伪造任意用户对任意消息的有效签名。这些攻击算法显示李—姜和谷—贾—姜的基于身份签名方案都是不安全的。最后分析了方案遭受攻击的原因,并给出了2个可能的改进措施。Li Ji-Guo et al. proposed an identity based signature scheme in the standard model in 2009, and a similar Scheme was proposed by Gu Ke et al. in 2011. Three algorithms were constructed to attack these two schemes. In these attacks, attacker could forge a valid signature on any message on behalf of any user in polynomial time only by choosing random parameters without knowing the signing key of the user. The attacks showed that their signature schemes were insecure. The root causes of attacks were further analyzed and some possible improvements were given in the end.

关 键 词：基于身份签名 伪造攻击 双线性映射 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]