考虑损失厌恶一对多型供应链的收益共享契约  

Revenue-sharing contract in supply chains with single supplier and multiple loss-averse retailers

作　　者：李绩才[1,2] 周永务[1] 肖旦[1] 钟远光[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广州510641 [2]浙江师范大学行知学院,金华321004

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2013年第2期71-82,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71131003;70971041);浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(Y6110095);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(10151064101000003)

摘　　要：以一个两阶段的供应链系统为研究背景,建立了下游损失厌恶型零售商之间存在竞争的收益共享契约协调模型.研究发现,竞争性的多零售商之间存在唯一的纳什均衡总订货量使其期望效用实现最大化,且总订货量随零售商数目的增加而增加、随零售商风险厌恶程度的增加而减少.在此基础上,进一步分析了在整个供应链系统中存在唯一的"批发价-收益共享系数"比值能够使供应链利用收益共享契约达到协调,并推导了系统实现协调时最优契约参数之间的关系;最后结合数值实例验证了供应链收益共享契约机制的有效性.This paper develops revenue-sharing contract coordination model in a two-stage supply chain consis- ting of a supplier and multiple loss-averse retailers. It is found that there is a unique Nash equilibrium total or- der quantity to maximize the expected utility of multiple competing loss-averse retailers, and the optimal total order quantity increases as the number of retailers increases but decreases as the degree of risk aversion increa- ses. Furthermore, a unique ratio of wholesale price and revenue sharing fraction is proved to coordinate the whole supply chain based on revenue-sharing contract mechanism, and the relation between the optimal con- tractual parameters are deduced. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the theoretical results of the proposed model.

关 键 词：损失厌恶 收益共享契约 供应链协调 

分 类 号：O227[理学—运筹学与控制论] F224.9[理学—数学]