付费方式、医生行为与激励偏差研究  

Study on Method of Payment,Physician Behavior and Motivation Deviation

作　　者：梁金刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学劳动人事学院,北京100872

出　　处：《社会保障研究》2012年第5期49-53,共5页Social Security Studies

基　　金：中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目(项目批准号:12XNH087)成果

摘　　要：付费方式的初衷是控制医疗支出、提高服务质量,而现实中却促使诱导消费、医疗纠纷不断涌现,医生行为的激励机制发生偏差。医保付费方式改革迫在眉睫,既有卫生体制下,建议以付费方式为新的切入点,使医生收入与服务质量、服务人数联系起来,实行医保定点医师付费管理制度,对医院医生医疗服务实行分类付费、混合付费,对社区医生实行双向签约、按人头付费制度,实现医保患三方的利益相容。The original intention of the payment is controlling medical expenses, improving service quality, in reality, it promotes induced consumption, more and more medical disputes, incentives of physician behavior error occurs. Reform of payment methods is imminent, at present, the article argues we should take the payment methods as a new entrance, link doctor~ income and quality of service, the service number, implement designated medicare physician payment management system, take a classification pay, the mixture payment methods, implement two -way contract, and＂ per capita payment＂ on Community physicians, to achieve the compatibility of the medicare risk of tripartite.

关 键 词：付费方式 医生行为 激励偏差 利益相容 

分 类 号：R197.1[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]