中国自然遗产管理主体博弈分析  

A Game Analysis on the Main Bodies of the Natural Heritage Management in China

作　　者：罗金华[1,2] 袁书琪[1] 滕剑仑[3] 

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学地理科学学院,福建福州350007 [2]三明学院海峡理工学院,福建三明365004 [3]三明学院管理学院,福建三明365004

出　　处：《三明学院学报》2013年第1期1-5,共5页Journal of Sanming University

基　　金：福建省高校服务海西建设重点项目(HX200808)

摘　　要：从国家公园管理模式的视角,对中国自然遗产管理主体及其集权和分权管理体制进行博弈分析,结果表明:中国自然遗产管理可以采用国家公园管理模式,并以中央集权管理体制为宜,即中央政府直接参与、对自然遗产地实行直线垂直的统一管理。这种体制有利于中央政府强化国家统一的管理目标和职能,对自然遗产地进行统一的利益分配和协调监督,明确国家与地方之间、各利益主体之间的责权利,使各博弈参与人着眼于总体利益和长期利益,在博弈过程中进行有效合作和监督,协同保护遗产地的资源和生态环境,从而发挥国家公园管理模式的效率最大化和利益最优化的功能。From the perspective of the national park management model, the analysis by game theory on the main bodies of natural heritage management and its centralization and decentralization management system in China shows that the national park management model is applicable to China＇s natural heritage management,and that the centralized management system is favorable with vertical management of the central government directly involved, and. This management system focuses the game players on the overall interests and long-term interests and is better for the Central Government to strengthen the national management objectives and functions, to carry out unified interest allocation and coordination of supervision. It also helps the players to achieve an effective cooperation, supervision and collaborative environmental protection in the process of the game, maximize the efficiency and optimize the benefits of the model.

关 键 词：自然遗产 管理体制 中央集权 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F592.1[经济管理—旅游管理]