政企关系对企业现金持有决策的作用  

The study of Political connections' impact on corporate cash decision

作　　者：王成亮[1] 陈金龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《三明学院学报》2013年第1期17-22,共6页Journal of Sanming University

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金(12YJA630012);福建省自然科学基金项目(2011J01382);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金(JB-SK1103)

摘　　要：目前研究政企关系对企业现金持有量的作用机理的文章较少。以2007年—2010年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究对象,用政府补贴衡量政企关系,研究了政企关系对企业现金持有量的影响及其影响路径。研究发现:政企关系越好的企业,其现金持有量也越多,投资支出是二者之间作用的部分中介变量;其作用路径为政企关系越好的企业,出于多种原因,其投资支出也越多,进而为实现这些增加的投资支出,企业的现金持有量也随之增加。Few articles have covered the mechanisms that how political connections affect the cash holdings. By measuring political connections with government subsidies, and taking the data of the A-share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Securities Exchange from 2007 to 2010 as study samples, this paper deals with the relationship between political connections and cash holdings, and the mechanism of them. Our study shows that the company with better political connections holds more cash and that the investment expenditure is a partial metavariable between the two. The way is that if a company has a better political connection, for some reasons, its investment expenditure will be more and, to enforce these investments, the level of cash holdings will be higher.

关 键 词：政企关系 现金持有量 作用机理 

分 类 号：F123.15[经济管理—世界经济]