被征农地增值分配的动态合作博弈研究——一个讨价还价理论的视角  

On Dynamic Cooperation Game of the Allocation of Value Increments of Farming Land Expropriation:From the Angle of Bargaining Theory

作　　者：王培志[1] 杨依山[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学国际经贸学院,山东济南250014 [2]山东财经大学文化与世界经济发展研究中心(所),山东济南250014 [3]山东大学历史文化学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《财经研究》2013年第3期87-98,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金项目(11YAZH093;2YJC790121);山东省社会科学规划研究重点项目(09BJGJ29);山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金项目(BS1073510010);山东省博士后创新项目(201203080)

摘　　要：文章基于政府、企业和农民三方利益主体在被征农地增值分配中的短、中、长期博弈关系,利用讨价还价理论和动态博弈模型,对农地改变用途后增值分配的公平与效率问题进行了系统研究。文章首先在界定企业和农民的初始禀赋、风险偏好和效用函数的基础上,求解并对比了完全信息和不完全信息下企业和农民的博弈均衡解及其资源配置效率和社会福利,然后进一步分析了政府采取功利主义和平等主义原则对企业和农民的讨价还价解的影响及其动态变化,最后对现有征地政策给出了相关建议。Based on the short-term, medium-term and long-term game relationship among governments, enterprises and farmers with regard to the allocation of value increments of farming land expropriation, this paper employs the bargaining theory and a dynamic game model to make a systematic study of the fairness and efficiency of the allocation of value increments after the change in farming land use. Based on the definition of the characteristics of enterprises and farmers such as initial endowment, risk preference and utility function, it offers and compares the equilibrium solutions, the resources distribution efficiency and social welfare of enterprises and farmers under perfect and imperfect information. Then it further studies the effects of utilitarianism and equalitarianism taken by governments on the bargaining solution between enterprises and farmers and the dynamic changes. Lastly, it provides relevant suggestions about current policies of farming land expropriation.

关 键 词：征地 讨价还价 功利主义 平等主义 

分 类 号：F301[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32