基于演化博弈的风险投资退出歧视价格拍卖竞价系统均衡研究  

Research on Bidding Equilibrium of VC Exit Discriminatory Auction System Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：郑君君[1] 蒋伟良[1] 邹祖绪[1] 韩笑[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2013年第1期185-192,共8页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071120)

摘　　要：本文以风险投资退出股权歧视价格拍卖为研究背景,运用演化博弈的方法研究异质投标企业的竞价策略,得出了在不同的市场供需情况下竞价策略演化的一般规律。研究表明:竞价系统最终均衡不仅与投标企业相对支付有关,而且与市场供需情况以及系统初始状态有关。最后指出通过设置竞价下限、隐藏市场供给以及信号传递可以有效地促进投标企业选择高价策略。Taking the VCS exit equity discriminatory auction as research background, evolutionary game theory is emploged to study the bidding strategies of heterogeneous companies, and the general evolution rules of bidding strategies under different market supply and demand conditions are found. The result shows that the final bidding evolution relates to not only the relative payment of bidders, but also supply and demand conditions in the VC exit market and system＇s initial states. It is concluded that setting a lowest bidding limit, hiding the market supply and signal transmission can effectively promote companies to choose high-priced bidding strategy.

关 键 词：歧视价格拍卖 演化博弈 风险投资退出 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F062.5