面向减排的动态博弈均衡研究  

Research on Dynamic Gaming Equilibrium for the Emission Reduction

作　　者：顾红[1] 尤建新[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学,上海201804

出　　处：《阅江学刊》2013年第1期45-51,共7页Yuejiang Academic Journal

基　　金：国家科技支撑计划资助项目"低碳社区建设关键技术集成应用示范研究"(2009BAC62B01);国家科技支撑计划项目"促进低碳经济发展的科技;产业与金融政策研究"(2009BAC62B01-05);国家自然科学基金"低碳效应对于我国城市空间重构的作用机理研究与模型化解释:以上海为例"(71103128)

摘　　要：环境污染已经严重制约我国经济和社会的发展。全社会对环境改善的期望与政府、企业、社会利益的矛盾日渐凸显,节能减排问题迫在眉睫。减排过程中的博弈者由三方利益相关者组成,分别是政府,企业和社会公众,三方都是追求自身利益最大化的完全理性个体。由此建立完美信息动态模型,分析博弈均衡解,以促进企业减排,遏制企业通过行贿等手段损害社会公众利益、政府部门为一己私利而收受贿赂等行为。社会组织应当在企业、政府部门和公众三者之间进行有效地协调,加强对政府部门的监管,加强信息沟通,促进减排目标的实现。Environmental pollution has seriously restricted China＇s economic and social development. The conflicts between the whole society＇s expectation for environmental improvement and governmental interests, corporate interests and social interests are growing nowadays. The problem of energy conservation and emission reduction is extremely urgent. The players of emission reduction consist of the following stakeholders： govern ment, enterprises and the public that are rational parties pursuing their maximum interests. Therefore, the perfect dynamic information model is established and the gaming equilibrium is analyzed so as to promote emission reduction and restrain the behaviors that the enterprises damage public interests by bribery and governmental departments take bribes for private benefits. Social Organizations should effectively coordinate enterprises, gov ernmental departments and public, enhance supervision of governmental departments, and strengthen informa tion communication so as to realize the goal of emission reduction.

关 键 词：减排 监督 企业 政府 社会公众 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程] F205