俄日两国“北方四岛”领土纠纷问题的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of Russia-Japan Territorial Disputes on the Northern Islands

作　　者：吴笛[1] 车维汉[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院 [2]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院世界经济与贸易系

出　　处：《东北亚论坛》2013年第2期15-24,129,共10页Northeast Asia Forum

基　　金：上海财经大学国家级项目后续基金项目(2012110831)

摘　　要：博弈论和国家利益等相关理论对于研究俄日两国"北方四岛"领土纠纷问题,有较强的解释力。日本不会放弃对"北方四岛"的索要,而俄罗斯也不会轻易归还或部分归还"北方四岛",甚至必要时会加强在"北方四岛"乃至远东地区的军力部署。俄日两国在资本和自然资源方面分别具有不同的比较优势,在博弈模型的纳什均衡中:俄罗斯选择"据守",日本选择"索要,合作"。"北方四岛"问题将会变得长期化。该领土问题的解决,将取决于未来国际政治经济形势,取决于俄日两国彼此之间权力的消长,取决于两国之间的新的博弈均衡。This article analyzes and concludes the experiences and lessons about the Russia-Japan diplomatic affairs in solving the Northern Islands territorial dispute,putting forward that Japan can hardly give up territorial claims on the Northern Islands as well as it is impossible for Russia to wholly or partly terminate the occupation of the Northern Islands.Russia may strengthen the military force in the Northern Islands and even the whole Far East region when necessary.What's more,since Russia and Japan have comparative advantages on natural recourses and capital respectively,solution of the disputes depends on future international political and economical situation,the switch of power between Russia and Japan,and the new game equilibrium between the two countries.

关 键 词：“北方四岛” 领土纠纷 俄日关系 博弈论 

分 类 号：D993[政治法律—国际法学]