中国上市公司再融资之谜——基于控制权私有收益的理论解释  

The Mystery of Refinancing of China Listed Companies:Based on the Theory Explaination Private Benefits Control

作　　者：杜魁[1] 朱文莉[1] 

机构地区：[1]陕西科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710021

出　　处：《商丘师范学院学报》2012年第11期101-104,共4页Journal of Shangqiu Normal University

摘　　要：我国上市公司的融资偏好一直存在着与国外经典融资理论相悖的情况,众多学者提出了很多观点,但都缺乏说服力。控制权私有收益理论应当是解释我国上市公司再融资之谜的一个全新分析视角。通过相关模型的分析我们得出结论:我国存在股权融资偏好的原因是控股股东追求控制权私有收益的结果。The financing preference of China listed companies exists the situation that is contrary to the classic theory in foreign countries. Many scholars put forward many views, but they are all at the lack of persuasion. At a new angle of view private benefits control this article draws the conclusion last：the reason sharehold financing partiality of the companies of our country is that the dominating shareholders＇ acts of seeking private benefits control.

关 键 词：再融资 控制权私有收益 模型 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]