保护性股权激励与现金股利政策——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Dividend-Protected Stock Incentive and Cash Dividend Policy——Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in China

作　　者：胡国强[1] 张俊民[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学商学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2013年第2期18-26,共9页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"产权视角下的审计师声誉机制及其经济后果研究"(项目编号71272189);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"内部控制与独立审计的耦合效应研究:财务重述视角"(项目编号12YJA790193)

摘　　要：基于中国高管股权激励契约中股利保护性条款的特殊制度安排,本文采用Relogit模型与多元线性模型实证分析中国上市公司股权激励对其现金股利支付政策的影响。研究发现,在未控制公司规模下,实施股权激励的公司相比未实施激励的公司更具有现金支付倾向,且现金股利支付水平更高。通过建立联立方程组考虑内生性问题后,以上结论依然成立。Based on especially institutional arrangement of executive stock incentive contract including dividend - pro- tected terms in China, this paper empirically examines the impacts of executive stock options incentive on the cash dividend policy, using relogit model and multiple linear model. Without controlling firms＇ size,this study finds that these companies with stock options incentive has a tendency to pay cash dividend and has a higher level of cash dividend payout than that of these companies without stock options incentive. These conclusions still stand after considering the problem of endogene- ity by building the system of simultaneous equations.

关 键 词：保护性股权激励 现金股利 终极产权 Relogit模型 

分 类 号：E275.4[军事—军事理论]