不对称信息下的企业排污与政府管制分析  

Analysis of Enterprise Polluting and Government Regulation under Information Asymmetry

作　　者：殷志平[1,2] 王先甲[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430081 [2]武汉大学系统工程研究所,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2013年第1期91-93,110,共4页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60574071)

摘　　要：由于信息不对称和负外部性的存在,污染者有不断向外界排污的激励,环境污染已成为障碍可持续发展的严重问题。为了减轻环境污染,代表公共利益的政府必须对企业的污染行为进行管制。在解释环境污染问题产生的经济根源的基础上,阐述环境治理过程中政府的管制原则和目标,利用博弈理论分析政府管制对企业排污行为的影响,提出了如何采取有效的惩罚措施,充分发挥政府管制职能作用的策略建议。Due to information asymmetry and negative externality, polluters have been motivated to emit pollution to the out-side. Today, environmental pollution is becoming a serious obstacle for the sustainable development. As the representative and protector of public interests, the government must regulate the polluting behavior of enterprises. Based on the economic interpretation of environmental pollution problems, the principle and the objective of government regulation in the control of pollution were discussed, the influence of government regulation on the polluting behavior of enterprises was analyzed according to game theory. The conclusion is that the effective punishing measures must be taken to give full play to the role of government regulation.

关 键 词：信息不对称 污染治理 政府管制 外部性 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F062.2