基于收益共享合同的工程质量优化研究  

Analysis of Project Quality Optimization Based on Revenue Sharing Contract

作　　者：李真[1,2] 程书萍[3] 李迁[3] 孟庆峰[2] 

机构地区：[1]江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏镇江212003 [2]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013 [3]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2013年第1期164-170,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70831002);国家自然科学基金项目(70971061,71001028,71001049,71101069,71171099);“十一五”国家科技支撑计划重点项目(2011BAG07B05);国家社会科学基金重大项目(11&ZD169);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2012MS21024);江苏省博士后科研资助(1202115C)

摘　　要：针对业主与多标段承包商群体的一对多结构,考虑业主如何通过收益共享合同对承包商群体进行激励以优化工程质量,构建了承包商个体具有公平偏好情境下的多阶段群体激励模型,通过计算实验方法探讨了不同收益共享系数下的激励效率及其演化。研究表明:基于业主角度,收益共享合同能够在一定程度上实现收益与质量的"双赢";承包商个体的公平感知对激励绩效会产生负面影响;提高收益共享系数有利于提高激励效果的稳定性及工程质量;收益共享系数的确定需要遵循适度原则。This paper studies one owner and many contractors construction system, in which the owner uses revenue sharing contract, to stimulate contractors on project quality coordination. We build a multi-stage incentive model on condition that contractors have fairness perceptions, and make an analysis of performance and evolution under different sharing contract coefficients by computational experiment. The results show that： based on the owner＇ s benefits, a revenue sharing contract can both improve his profit and construction quality to some degree ; individual fairness perceptions have a negative inf/uence on incentive performance; increasing revenue sharing coefficient is helpful to improve the stability of the incentive effect and construction quality ; revenue sharing coefficient should be determined properly to achieve a high incentive effect.

关 键 词：工程管理 质量优化 计算实验 收益共享合同 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]