基于“激励相容”的企业集团绩效信息管理机制分析  

Incentive Compatibility Mechanism of Enterprise Group Performance Information Management

作　　者：罗彪[1] 刘新雨[1] 王成园[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2013年第1期216-220,共5页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金委青年科学基金资助项目(71272064)

摘　　要：为解决企业集团总部与子公司存在着基于绩效信息的博弈问题,本文通过拓展基本的委托代理模型,分析子公司操纵绩效信息的条件及绩效信息操纵程度的影响因素。结果表明,当总部对子公司激励采用固定工资制或总部可完全监督时,子公司不操纵,并且总部应从提高监督的有效性、子公司操纵业绩的惩罚系数、子公司绩效操纵难度系数、盈利能力和降低努力成本系数五个方面着手,降低子公司绩效信息操纵程度。集团据此建立绩效信息管理机制,提高集团绩效信息管理效率和效果。In this paper, we set up an expanded principal-agent model. We analyse the conditions of controlling subsidiaries manipulate performance information and the factors of manipulative degree. The results show that, when the incentive mechanism of subsidiaries is fixed wage or headquarter can fully supervise, subsidiaries will not manipulate performance information. And headquarter can reduce subsidiaries manipulative degree through improving supervision effectiveness, penalty coefficient, manipulative difficulty coefficient, profit capability and decreasing the subsidiaries operation cost coefficient. Enterprise group establish subsidiary performance managerial mechanism according to these factors will improve the efficiency and the effect of subsidiary performance management.

关 键 词：管理科学 绩效管理机制 委托代理 绩效操纵 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]