金融生态与政府行为边界:进化稳定均衡解释  

The Financial Ecology and the Government Behavior Boundary: Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium Interpretation

作　　者：吴庆田[1] 李晓宁[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《郑州航空工业管理学院学报》2013年第1期52-56,共5页Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(7120324);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(10YJA790201);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(12YJA790065);湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(12JJ3086)

摘　　要：自"金融生态"一词提出后,学术界围绕金融生态进行了大量研究,并逐渐明晰了政府行为与金融生态之间的关系。文章采用进化博弈的方法对中央政府、地方政府和微观主体三者进行分析,认为三者之间是一个"选择"与"突变"的互动博弈,并据此界定了政府行为边界,从宏观、中观与微观三个层面找到优化金融生态环境的路径。Since the financial ecology was raised, academic circles have carried on research around it, and gradually have known the relationship between the government behavior and the financial ecology. In this pa- per through doing an analysis of the relationship among the central government, local government and micro subjects by evolutionary game, we know that there is an interactive game that is preferential and mutational a- mong them, and then define the boundary of the government behavior. At last, we find the path that optimizes the financial ecology by macro, medium and micro -levels.

关 键 词：金融生态 政府行为 进化博弈 进化稳定均衡 

分 类 号：F832.1[经济管理—金融学]