FDI三方博弈分析  

An Analysis on FDI Tripartite Game

作　　者：张晴[1] 吴彬[1] 常宏建[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学工商管理学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《山东财政学院学报》2013年第2期23-28,共6页Journal of Shandong Finance Institute

基　　金：山东省教育厅社会科学研究项目"跨国公司战略联盟的法律经济学分析"(S07YD21);山东省社会科学基金重点项目"跨国公司战略联盟的法律经济学框架"(07JDB021)

摘　　要：跨国公司、母国和东道国之间存在着错综复杂的竞争合作关系,三者有着不同的博弈目标。本文建立了来自发达国家的大型跨国公司及其母国,及我国作为东道国参与的三方博弈模型,诠释了现实否定最优解的原因,得出东道国应采取措施,尽量减少冲突支付对收益的消极影响的结论,提出了营造政策环境、健全法律体系、消除"心理距离"以及提高政府效率等提高东道国收益的建议。In between multinational corporations, home country and host country, there is an intricate competi tive and cooperative relationship, with different side harboring different game targets. In this paper, a model of tri partite game involving large multinational corporations from developed countries and their home countries, and China as the host country is established, explaining the reason why reality denies the optimal solution, coming to the con clusion that the host country should ＂take measures to minimize the effect of conflict payment on profit＂. The paper also suggests creating a better environment, perfecting the legal system, eliminating the ＂psychological distance＂ as well as improving government efficiency and so on.

关 键 词：FDI三方 跨国公司 合作博弈 制度环境规制 

分 类 号：F742[经济管理—国际贸易]