产权配置、地方政府干预与上市公司资产剥离——基于同属管辖交易视角的研究  

Property Configuration,Local Government Intervention and Divestiture of Listed Companies: From the Perspective of the Same Jurisdiction Trade

作　　者：徐虹[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学管理学院,安徽马鞍山243002

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2013年第1期23-36,共14页Accounting and Economics Research

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(10CJL022)

摘　　要：本文以2004-2005年沪深A股上市公司资产剥离事件为研究对象,基于同属管辖交易的视角,研究地方政府如何借助产权的配置(不同的产权属性与层级),影响上市公司资产剥离的交易行为以及这种交易行为的财富效应。研究发现,财政分权导致的地方政府干预是形成上市公司资产剥离同属管辖交易行为的一个主要因素,不同产权下资产剥离的同属管辖交易行为呈现显著差异,相对于中央政府控制和非政府控制的上市公司而言,地方政府控制的上市公司更倾向于进行资产剥离同属管辖交易;市场给予上市公司资产剥离的整体反应是消极的,且同属交易与非同属交易公司在资产剥离交易宣告期间的财富效应不存在显著差异。From the perspective of the same jurisdiction of trade, using listed companies with divesti- ture transactions in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange markets from 2004 to 2005 as the sample, the paper studies how the local government influences the divestiture behavior of listed company through the property configuration and the wealth effect of divestiture announcement. It is found that government inter- ference rooted in the fiscal decentralization is a major factor causing the divestiture transactions in the same jurisdiction, and that divestiture transactions differ significantly in different ownership. Specifically, com- pare with companies controlled by central government and non-government, the divestiture of listed compa- nies controlled by local government is more likely to be in the same jurisdiction. The market reacts nega- tively to divestiture and there isn＇t a significant difference in returns between the divestiture transactions in the same jurisdiction and the non-jurisdiction.

关 键 词：资产剥离 地方政府干预 同属管辖交易 产权配置 财富效应 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]