民国中央和省府的“权”“利”博弈——以柏文蔚导淮计划的夭折为例  

A Game of“Power ”&“Interests”between the Central Government and the Provincial Power Factions in the Period of the Republic of China

作　　者：陈蕊[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学历史系,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《南京政治学院学报》2013年第1期113-116,共4页Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute of Politics

基　　金：国家社会科学重大招标项目"江南地域文化的历史演进"(10&ZD069);国家社科基金项目"中国地区性社会发展与社会冲突比较研究"(09BZS051);江苏省高校哲学社会科学重点研究项目"江苏地域文化的历史演进与现代发展"(2011ZDIXM014)

摘　　要：民国时期中央和地方实力派的关系一直存在不稳定性,这在行政、军事、经济、财政等方面表现得尤为明显。而"权力"和"利益"则处于中央和地方实力关系博弈的核心。以柏文蔚的导淮计划及其夭折为例,可以审视民国中央和省府的"权""利"博弈。The relationship between the central government and the local power factions in the Minguo period was unstable, which was evidently reflected in the administrative, military, economic, financial fields. The ＂power＂ and ＂interests＂＂ became the centre of the game between the central government and the local power factions. The failure of Bai Wenwei＇ Dao Huai plan was a good example, from which we can well examine such a game.

关 键 词：权利博弈 柏文蔚 导淮计划 民国 

分 类 号：K262.9[历史地理—历史学]