投资者有限理性与信息披露的资本成本效应  

Investors’ Bounded Rationality and the Cost Effect of Information Disclosure

作　　者：刘善存[1] 辛荣[1] 宋殿宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100191

出　　处：《系统工程》2013年第1期1-9,共9页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071010)

摘　　要：在行为金融框架下研究上市公司信息披露的资本成本效应,分析投资者有限理性和异质信念对上市公司信息披露决策的影响,揭示上市公司有限信息披露的机理。研究表明:针对不同的投资者信念差异环境,上市公司具有不同的最优信息披露数量决策,上市公司在最优数量内进行信息披露才能带来负向的资本成本效应。上市公司信息披露的资本成本效应随信念差异的不同而变化,当投资者过度自信导致信念差异时,上市公司进行信息披露的负向资本成本效应最大。投资者过度自信时,最优信息披露数量随理性投资者比重的提高而减少,投资者反应不足时,则相反。信息精度越高,最优信息披露数量越大。We study the capital cost effect of listed firms＇ information disclosure under the framework of behavioral finance, and we analyze the effects of bounded rationality and heterogeneous beliefs on listed company＇s optimal decision-making of information disclosure, with the purpose of revealing the mechanism of listed firms＇ limited information disclosure. The results show that the listed firms will take different optimal information disclosure quantity according to the investors＇ heterogeneous beliefs environment, and information disclosure will reduce the cost of capital only in the case that the quantity is below the optimal number. The capital cost effect of listed firms＇ information disclosure varies with investors＇ heterogeneous beliefs, and under the environment of irrational investors＇ over-confidence, an increase amount of information disclosure bring the cost of capital more sharply down. Under the situation of irrational investors＇ over-confidence, the optimal number increases with the proportion of rational investor, but under the condition of irrational investors＇ underestimation of the signal accuracy, we have the opposite conclusion. Through further analysis, we find that the optimal number increase with the accuracy of the information.

关 键 词：异质信念 有限理性 信息披露 资本成本效应 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]