巴克莱公司LIBOR虚报操纵案分析  

A Case Study of Barclays' LIBOR Manipulation

作　　者：韩冰洁[1,2] 张鹏[2] 孙海霞[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学工商管理博士后流动站 [2]中国金融期货交易所,上海200433

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2013年第3期41-45,共5页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年自然科学基金面上项目(71002011);第51批中国博士后科学基金面上资助(资助编号:2012M511049)

摘　　要：2012年6月美国商品期货交易委员会、英国金融服务监管局和美国司法部等多家机构认定巴克莱公司等报价银行在金融危机期间操纵Libor报价。案件反映出巴克莱等公司报价机制的不完善:一方面缺乏完整有效的内控系统,另一方面合规部门没有完全尽责,没有建立信息隔离机制。操纵案启示我们:第一,扩大公开集中交易的场内市场价格影响力;第二,完善大型金融机构的内控制度,防范利益冲突;第三,加强衍生品市场的立法建设。In June 2012 Barclays was certified to manipulate LIBOR offer during the financial crisis by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the UK Financial Services Authority and the U.S. Department of Justice. This case reflected that the offer mechanisms of Barclays and other companies were imperfect. On one hand, these companies were short of complete and effective internal control systems; on the other hand, compliance departments were not fully conscientious and have not established information isolation mechanisms. This case is very instructive to us. Firstly, we should expand the influence of exchange traded prices. Secondly, we should improve the internal control system of large financial institutions, against conflict of interest. Thirdly, we should toughen up the legislation building of the derivatives market.

关 键 词：LIBOR操纵案 巴克莱银行 利率操纵 衍生品监管 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]