城市廉租住房退出机制的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Exit Mechanism of Urban Low-rent Housing

作　　者：张津君[1,2] 韩美贵[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京农业大学工学院,江苏南京210031 [2]中国民航大学经济与管理学院,天津300300

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2013年第1期73-77,共5页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(KYZ201173);住房与城乡建设部软科学研究(2011-R-17);江苏省农机基金(GXS10011);南京农业大学人文社会科学研究基金(SK2011022)

摘　　要：当前我国城市廉租住房市场中,普遍存在承租户隐瞒家庭收入、不主动腾退住房现象,这与廉租住房退出机制的不完善密切相关。针对此问题,在理性经济人假设下,构建了政府与承租户之间的完全信息静态博弈模型。通过纳什均衡解分析,揭示了政府和承租户的行为选择规律,即影响二者行为选择的关键因素在于参与人选择不同策略时的收益,得出引入奖励机制能有效规避承租户不良行为,降低政府监管成本的结论。为提高退出机制实施效力,有效实现公平分配,提出了政府解决相关现实问题的政策路径。For low-rent housing in China, tenants always like to conceal their family income and rarely voluntarily empty the houses since the exit mechanism is not perfect. Aiming to perfect the exit mechanism, based on the assumption of economic man, a complete information static game models between the government and the tenants is built. By analyzing the game Nash equilibrium, the behavior patterns of the government and the tenants were revealed and benefit is a key factor that has a significant impact on their behaviors. The incentive mechanism can effectively avoid illegal activities and reduce the cost of supervision. Some suggestions on policy making were given to improve the mechanism.

关 键 词：廉租住房 退出机制 静态博弈 监管 

分 类 号：TU12[建筑科学—建筑理论]