基于随机响应时间及准时交货激励的供应链博弈-协同模型与算法  

Supply Chain Game-Collaboration Model and Algorithm Based on Stochastic Response Time and Just-in-time Delivery Incentive

作　　者：方忠民[1] 陈治亚[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学交通运输工程学院,湖南长沙410075

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2013年第6期28-34,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：湖南省哲学社会科学基金(2010YBB246);湖南省自然科学基金(09JJ3135)

摘　　要：在供应链战略合作伙伴关系的体系框架下,针对采购双方动态交互决策过程建立了以供应链中核心生产企业为主方,供应商为从方的Stackelberg博弈-协同模型.基于最优性分析讨论了准时采购过程中双方决策的交互影响关系,分析了Stackelberg均衡解的必要条件.最后提出了该模型的内嵌内点法的模拟退火算法.In the strategic cooperative partnership framework of supply chain, we have established the Stackelberg game model leading to collaboration according to the dynamic interactive decision-making process of buyers and sellers among which the manufacturer is the leader part and the suppliers are the followers. Based on the optimality analysis, we discuss the decision interaction relation in the just-in-time purchasing process and analyze the essential requirement of Stackelberg equilibrium solution with unconfined condition. Finally, we proposed the simulated annealing algorithm embedded with interior point method for the model.

关 键 词：协同 STACKELBERG博弈 随机响应时间 激励契约 模拟退火算法 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F274