农产品产地批发市场道德风险的协调策略  

Coordination Strategy of Moral Hazard for Agricultural Wholesale Market in the Producing Base

作　　者：尹新哲[1] 黄守军[2] 任玉珑[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川外语学院国别经济与国际商务研究中心,重庆市400031 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院.重庆市400044

出　　处：《中国流通经济》2013年第3期96-100,共5页China Business and Market

摘　　要：供应商和批发商避开产品产地批发市场直接交易时,双方缺乏对产品质量有效检测的道德风险增加了产品质量安全风险。本文先后考察并给出了以盈利为目标和不以盈利为目标两种情形下的产地批发市场道德风险协调策略及其适用范围。研究表明,在批发市场以盈利为目标时,若供应商和批发商的直接交易成本较小,批发市场的协调策略将失效;在批发市场不以盈利为目标时,其协调策略始终有效,但经营可能会亏损。在此基础上,提出了政府可行的管理建议。Quality safety risk of products rises owing to the moral hazard from lack of certification when suppliers and wholesalers trade with each other directly avoiding wholesale market in the producing base.The moral hazard coordination policies and their application scopes in conditions when the wholesale market aims at profit or not are investigated and given successively. The results indicate that when aiming at profit, its coordination policy would fail if the ditect trading cost of suppliers and wholesalers are little enough~ when not aiming at profi,its coordination policy would always work though the operation may be of deficit.On this basis, the feasible government management recommendations are put forward.

关 键 词：农产品 产地批发市场 道德风险 协调策略 

分 类 号：F304[经济管理—产业经济]